Reference: Every First-Party Resolver Kind

ChainRender ships 66 first-party resolver kinds — 61 resolve on-chain during the render eth_call, 5 reach an off-chain edge and therefore declare CLIENT_FETCH (grade ≤ C by Invariant R2). Each kind's details follow the table, in the same order. This page is generated from chainc/resolverkinds.ts, the same list vocabulary().resolverKinds, the builder and the MCP server's chainrender_search_kinds / chainrender_describe_kind read, so it cannot drift from them. For how resolvers work and how to write your own, see Resolvers and Writing a Resolver.

Encoding args. A slot's arg is the 0x-hex bytes the resolver receives. Encode them exactly as the kind says: abi.encode(...) of the listed args by default, or the raw concatenation when the kind is marked packed (for example ensName takes exactly the 20 address bytes and reverts bad args on a 32-byte abi.encode). test/resolverkind-args-drift.ts encodes the ENS kinds from these descriptors and resolves them against the real contracts.

Grades. Data edge on-chain means the read is part of the render eth_call; the app's grade still depends on everything else it declares (see The Trust Grade). A kind whose meaning is delegated to a mutable authority says so in its summary and grades ≤ C through the dependency axis.

All kinds

Details

uniV3Price

Live Uniswap V3 pool spot price from slot0().sqrtPriceX96 (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x756e695633507269636500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

uniV4Price

Live Uniswap V4 pool spot price via StateView.getSlot0(poolId) (READ_CHAIN); additive to V3; fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x756e695634507269636500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

uniV3Position

Render a Uniswap V3 LP position (pair, fee, tick range, liquidity, fees owed) via positions(tokenId); fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x756e695633506f736974696f6e00000000000000000000000000000000000000

aavePosition

Render an Aave V3 lending position (collateral, debt, borrowing power, health factor) via getUserAccountData(user); fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x61617665506f736974696f6e0000000000000000000000000000000000000000

uniQuote

Render a Uniswap V3 swap quote (expected amountOut) via QuoterV2 before signing; ESTIMATE only (swap must carry min-out); fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x756e6951756f7465000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

approvalState

Render whether an owner approved a spender for enough of a token (Approve vs Swap gating) via ERC-20 allowance; fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x617070726f76616c537461746500000000000000000000000000000000000000

curvePool

Render Curve pool state (get_dy quote / balances) broadening AMM coverage beyond Uniswap; get_dy is an ESTIMATE; fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6375727665506f6f6c0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

portfolio

Render an aggregated TOTAL summing many on-chain numeric reads (complements multiread which joins); fail-closed per read (partial total).

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x706f7274666f6c696f0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

cowOrder

Render the LIVE discrete order a CoW Protocol conditional/programmatic order (Composable CoW) would emit THIS block via getTradeableOrderWithSignature (READ_CHAIN); works for every order type (TWAP/StopLoss/GoodAfterTime/PerpetualStableSwap/TradeAboveThreshold); a revert means no valid order this block → fails closed to "not active".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636f774f72646572000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

First intent-DeFi resolver (doc 163). getTradeableOrderWithSignature is view but may revert BY DESIGN when no order is valid this block — the fail-closed floor renders that honestly. A live 'ready this block' badge / countdown is a ⚙ client enhancement, not this Grade-A read.

cowTwap

Decode a CoW TWAP order staticInput + block.timestamp into schedule progress — part X/N, next-slice countdown, per-part sell/min-limit, status pending/active/gap/finished (READ_CHAIN, pure); fails closed to "-".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636f775477617000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Renders the schedule the staticInput ENCODES, projected against block.timestamp (deterministic, Grade A). It does NOT assert the order is registered/tradeable on ComposableCoW — pair with the cowOrder kind for that live proof.

cowIntent

Verify a presented CoW app-data document matches the order appData it committed to (keccak256(fullAppData), per the CoW app-data SDK) ON CHAIN (READ_CHAIN) — "verified" / "app-data mismatch"; the anti-phishing "verify what you sign" integrity anchor; fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636f77496e74656e740000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Integrity ANCHOR only (Grade A keccak): proves the document you are shown is the one the order committed to. The human-readable decode of the hooks {target,callData,gasLimit} into a step plan is a CLIENT layer over these hash-verified bytes (on-chain JSON parsing is impractical) — the msg-712/sig-1271 split. Pair with cowOrder for the full card.

vault4626

Render an ERC-4626 tokenized vault: NAV per share (convertToAssets of 1 share), total assets, share supply, shares-per-asset (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x7661756c74343632360000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

convertToAssets/totalAssets are the vault's OWN valuation — a faithful render of what the vault reports, not a claim it is correct; the trust boundary is the vault's pricing logic. Composes with por-coverage + oracle-feed for a full vault panel.

vault7540

Render an ERC-7540 async vault request queue for a controller: pending/claimable redeem (shares) and pending/claimable deposit (assets) (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x7661756c74373534300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

The redemption/deposit queue tokenized-treasury products hide behind a dashboard, read trustlessly. Built for RWA/T-bill funds (async request/settle).

oracle-feed

Read an AggregatorV3-shaped oracle feed as on-chain state (READ_CHAIN); rendered with provenance (feed, round) and freshness (age, STALE past a caller bound); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6f7261636c652d66656564000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

credential

Verify a zero-knowledge proof ON CHAIN (READ_CHAIN) and render only the proven statement, never the witness. Fails closed to "Unverified".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x63726564656e7469616c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Statements: member-of-set

member-of-set: prove membership of a set (public root) revealing nothing about which member.

credential-bound

Verify a BOUND, single-use credential proof (READ_CHAIN): non-transferable (bound to its holder) and spendable once. Verifying is READ_CHAIN; consuming (spending the nullifier) is a separate WRITE_CHAIN action on the ownerless NullifierRegistry.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Consume step: WRITE_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x63726564656e7469616c2d626f756e6400000000000000000000000000000000

Statements: member-bound

member-bound: consuming spends the nullifier; a copied proof cannot be replayed (bound to its holder).

ensText

Read an ENS text record (avatar, url, com.twitter, …) for a namehash node, live on-chain.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x656e735465787400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

ensAddr

Resolve an ENS namehash node to its address, live on-chain.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: packed — the raw bytes, concatenated (abi.encodePacked)

Kind constant: 0x656e734164647200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

ensName

Verified primary ENS name for an address, live on-chain: reads .addr.reverse, then forward-resolves the name and requires it to point back to the address; mismatch or no record falls back.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: packed — the raw bytes, concatenated (abi.encodePacked)

Kind constant: 0x656e734e616d6500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

ensV2

ENSv2 record read live on-chain from the name's resolver (discovered once via the Universal Resolver at seed time): one lean staticcall that fits the render stipend. A CCIP-Read (EIP-3668 OffchainLookup) record renders "off-chain (CCIP)" — the floor detects the boundary but does not cross it; no resolver / empty → "—"; other revert → "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x656e735632000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Following a CCIP-Read record is a client hook (CLIENT_FETCH → ≤ C by R2) and is NOT what this kind does; this kind only reads on-chain and marks the boundary. Resolver discovery is a seed-time step, so a name that later changes resolver keeps rendering from the old one until re-seeded.

ensApp

Read a name app-manifest text key (chainrender.app) and render the app reference it points to (READ_CHAIN); empty -> "-"; ENS as the naming layer for ChainRender apps (dogfood).

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x656e734170700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

ensNameChain

ENSIP-19 multichain verified primary name: the name an address resolves to ON A GIVEN CHAIN (per-coinType reverse), forward-verified via addr(node,coinType)==who (READ_CHAIN); reverts to slot fallback on mismatch.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x656e734e616d65436861696e0000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Chain-aware identity. Correct + self-verifying, but renders a live name only where an ENSIP-19 reverse registrar for that coinType is deployed/populated (e.g. L1 coinType 60) — resolver-ready elsewhere.

identityVerified

Read whether an EAS attestation is valid for (subject, schema, uid) → "verified" / "unverified". Reveals the claim, not the data (doc 17).

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6964656e74697479566572696669656400000000000000000000000000000000

identityClaim

Read the claimed string a subject published under a valid EAS attestation; reverts to slot fallback otherwise.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6964656e74697479436c61696d00000000000000000000000000000000000000

por-coverage

Proof-of-Reserve coverage% = attested reserves ÷ token totalSupply (READ_CHAIN), with provenance (feed, round) + freshness and a backed / under-collateralized badge; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x706f722d636f7665726167650000000000000000000000000000000000000000

sibling kinds por-reserves / por-supply share the same args and return the reserve and supply figures.

por-reserves

Attested reserves from a Proof-of-Reserve feed, in feed units (READ_CHAIN); STALE-suffixed past the caller bound; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x706f722d72657365727665730000000000000000000000000000000000000000

por-supply

Token totalSupply in token units (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x706f722d737570706c7900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

erc3643-status

ERC-3643 holder compliance status " / " (verified / not verified, active / frozen) via the token's identity registry + isFrozen (READ_CHAIN). DISPLAY only — a value move re-checks on chain.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x657263333634332d737461747573000000000000000000000000000000000000

DISPLAY, not enforcement; identity registry + compliance are agent-mutable → grades ≤ C (DEP_MUTABLE), never A. Sibling kinds erc3643-verified / erc3643-frozen share these args.

erc3643-verified

Whether an address is a verified (KYC'd) ERC-3643 investor via identityRegistry.isVerified (READ_CHAIN). DISPLAY only; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x657263333634332d766572696669656400000000000000000000000000000000

agent-mutable source → grades ≤ C (DEP_MUTABLE).

erc3643-frozen

Whether an ERC-3643 holder is frozen via isFrozen (READ_CHAIN). DISPLAY only; fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x657263333634332d66726f7a656e000000000000000000000000000000000000

agent-mutable source → grades ≤ C (DEP_MUTABLE).

erc3643-can-transfer

Whether a transfer from→to of amount would currently pass the token's modular compliance via canTransfer (READ_CHAIN). A PREVIEW computed against caller-claimed addresses — UX, never a security boundary; fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x657263333634332d63616e2d7472616e73666572000000000000000000000000

DISPLAY / preview, not enforcement; agent-mutable compliance → grades ≤ C (DEP_MUTABLE).

cred-status

Credential lifecycle status VALID / EXPIRED / REVOKED / UNKNOWN (or "issuer mismatch") from a CredentialStatusRegistry (READ_CHAIN), with issuer-key provenance; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x637265642d737461747573000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

composes with the ZK credential kind: anonymous membership proof + revocable, issuer-bound validity. Sibling kind cred-valid returns valid/invalid.

cred-valid

"valid" iff the credential is VALID and (when expectedIssuer set) issued by that key — a single word for a gate binding (READ_CHAIN); else "invalid"; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x637265642d76616c696400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

efp-follows

Whether a caller-named EFP list currently follows a target address, by scanning the list's ops on chain (READ_CHAIN, last op wins, bounded scan); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6566702d666f6c6c6f7773000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

FORWARD read only (Grade A). Follower counts / reverse lookups are off-chain (EFP indexer) → grade ≤ C; not offered on chain. Sibling kind efp-state shares these args.

efp-state

Compact EFP relationship of a list to a target: following / blocked / muted / not following (READ_CHAIN, bounded scan); fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6566702d73746174650000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

block/mute are reserved EFP tags; per EFP a tag only counts while the address is also followed.

efp-tag

Whether a caller-named EFP list currently tags a target with a given tag, e.g. "friend" / "phisher" (READ_CHAIN, bounded scan); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6566702d74616700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

efp-list-size

The raw number of ops in a caller-named EFP list (READ_CHAIN); a list-size figure, NOT a follower count; fails closed.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6566702d6c6973742d73697a6500000000000000000000000000000000000000

this is the list's own op count, not how many accounts follow the list owner (that is an off-chain indexer aggregate).

rep-vouch

A single attester's vouch status for a subject under a topic: vouched / expired / revoked / unknown (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x7265702d766f7563680000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

delegated signal: an on-chain read, but its truth is only as good as the attester you trust → grades ≤ C (DEP_MUTABLE), never A. Topic is neutral to sign.

rep-tally

A transparent k-of-n tally: how many of a CALLER-SUPPLIED attester set currently hold a valid vouch for a subject under a topic (READ_CHAIN), rendered "k/n"; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x7265702d74616c6c790000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

NOT a global reputation score: every input is an attester the consumer chose; change the set, change the answer. A reverting attester read counts as not-valid (fail-closed per input). Grades ≤ C (delegated, DEP_MUTABLE).

rep-aggregate

Transparent k-of-n reputation across CALLER-supplied sources, rendered "k/n (grade X)" where X is the weakest source's grade ceiling (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x7265702d61676772656761746500000000000000000000000000000000000000

NOT a global score. Grade is capped at the weakest input (an A EFP follow can't launder a C vouch). Unreadable sources count as no-signal (fail-closed); all-unreadable → unavailable. New source types plug in via the IReputationSource adapter seam without changing this kind.

ccip-supported

Whether a Chainlink CCIP destination chain selector is currently supported by a caller-supplied Router, via isChainSupported (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636369702d737570706f72746564000000000000000000000000000000000000

on-chain fact of the router's current config (Grade A). The router is Chainlink-operated/upgradeable, so it is 'what the router currently reports,' the same honest posture as the oracle-feed price read.

ccip-fee

The CCIP fee QUOTE for a message to a destination selector, via Router.getFee, denominated in the feeToken (READ_CHAIN); a live quote (like a price); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636369702d666565000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

ESTIMATE/quote — the actual send (ccipSend) is a USER-declared action, decoded + value-gated, that ChainRender never performs. Delivery status is off-chain (CCIP indexer) → grade ≤ C, not a kind here.

sig-1271

Whether a message hash is validly signed by a CONTRACT ACCOUNT under ERC-1271, via isValidSignature (READ_CHAIN); "valid"/"invalid"; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x7369672d31323731000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Validity ONLY — the human meaning of the message is rendered client-side (msg-712), never asserted here.

stealth-meta

A registrant's ERC-6538 stealth meta-address (private-payments discovery), via stealthMetaAddressOf (READ_CHAIN); "not registered" if none; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x737465616c74682d6d6574610000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Discovery is the only on-chain (Grade A) part. The ERC-5564 announce SEND is a declared action; scanning announcements is off-chain (≤ C). ChainRender never custodies a key or derives the address server-side.

shielded-root

A shielded/note pool's current Merkle ROOT (bytes32) via caller-supplied view calldata (READ_CHAIN); a public invariant, never a balance; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x736869656c6465642d726f6f7400000000000000000000000000000000000000

Render the privacy BOUNDARY honestly (doc 157 §7): only publicly-provable invariants. Decrypted balances are a client-side, viewing-key-gated enhancement (≤ C, local), never a chain read; shield/unshield/transfer leaks are labelled by the client-side privacy-leak decoder.

shielded-set

A shielded pool's commitment / ANONYMITY-SET size (uint256) via caller-supplied view calldata (READ_CHAIN); how private the pool actually is right now; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x736869656c6465642d7365740000000000000000000000000000000000000000

A small anonymity set is WEAK privacy — the render says so (card grades it), never masks it.

shielded-nullifier

Whether a nullifier is spent in a shielded pool (bool) via caller-supplied view calldata (READ_CHAIN); "spent"/"unspent"; fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x736869656c6465642d6e756c6c69666965720000000000000000000000000000

Double-spend / already-claimed check WITHOUT revealing identity — the on-chain half of the ZK/nullifier primitive we already ship (credential-bound + NullifierRegistry).

msg-712

Render the EIP-712/191 message you are ABOUT TO SIGN, honestly and fail-closed on opaque fields (anti-phishing "render what you sign"). Client-side render → grade ≤ C; the caller MUST show the warnings.

Data edge: off-chain · Capability: CLIENT_FETCH · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x6d73672d37313200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Not a chain read — it renders CLIENT INPUT (the to-be-signed message). Pairs with sig-1271 (the on-chain validity check). Fails closed: any field it cannot fully type is marked OPAQUE and warned; it never says 'safe to sign.'

poster-feed

An ERC-3722 Poster feed (public posts). Content lives only in NewPost EVENT LOGS (no state), so it is read via eth_getLogs — on-chain DATA but not a re-executable view → grade ≤ C, labeled off-chain.

Data edge: off-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN + CLIENT_FETCH · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x706f737465722d66656564000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Event-log feed via the client-side posterFeedFilter() adapter — never dressed as Grade A. Declaring a post (post()) is a user action.

stealth-scan

Scan ERC-5564 Announcement logs to find stealth payments to you. Log data via eth_getLogs (not a view) + local recipient derivation → grade ≤ C, labeled off-chain; ownership derivation is client-side.

Data edge: off-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN + CLIENT_FETCH · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x737465616c74682d7363616e0000000000000000000000000000000000000000

The scan is an off-chain log read; deciding which announcements are YOURS uses your viewing key, client-side. ChainRender never holds the key.

clip-count

The number of clips in an on-chain skeletal-animation library (a CRCL pack stored as a Dependency), via ClipLibraryResolver reassembling the pack from a caller-supplied registry (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636c69702d636f756e7400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Motion is DATA, stored/hash-verified like p5.js/three.js. Additional clip libraries are additive (each a new content-addressed Dependency) — expandable without editing anything.

clip-slice

One clip's bytes (hex) from an on-chain skeletal-animation library, sliced by the pack's own directory, for the client FK player to decode + play as the deterministic floor (READ_CHAIN, Grade A); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636c69702d736c69636500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

The clip bytes are the on-chain FLOOR: chainc/skeletalanim.ts decodes them and plays via forward kinematics (pure math, no GPU, reproducible → Grade A). A GPU-skinned mesh over the same rig/clip is an optional enhancement that fails closed to the SVG puppet floor. Inspired by UniMate's representation, NOT its neural model (doc 158).

settle-status

Settlement status word (funded / disbursed / settled / defaulted) read from a settlement agreement's on-chain state (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x736574746c652d73746174757300000000000000000000000000000000000000

sibling kinds settle-principal / settle-repaid share the same args. The render honestly splits the trust: escrow + distribution are on-chain (A) while the disburse/repay legs are attested (≤ C) — the load-bearing rule of docs/172 §5.

settle-principal

Pooled principal of a settlement agreement, in asset units (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x736574746c652d7072696e636970616c00000000000000000000000000000000

settle-repaid

Total repaid ÷ principal as a percent string (READ_CHAIN); fails closed to "unavailable" (incl. zero principal).

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x736574746c652d72657061696400000000000000000000000000000000000000

trust-facets

Render a contract's self-declared TRUST FACETS (custody · user-only exit · relayer binding · artifact pinning) from its on-chain trustFacets() view (READ_CHAIN); a proof-/EIP-712-bound relayer is shown as "cannot alter", a mutable one is flagged. Fails closed to "unavailable". The shared honesty primitive other cards compose.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x74727573742d6661636574730000000000000000000000000000000000000000

door-knocks

A door's PUBLIC TRIBUTE aggregate (total burned, knock count, loudest knock) read from a DoorRegistry's on-chain state via a view (READ_CHAIN) → Grade A. The message history is NOT here (see door-feed, ≤C). Fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x646f6f722d6b6e6f636b73000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

The on-chain half of a door. Pairs with door-feed (the ≤C message list). knock() is a user action, not a render.

door-feed

A door's MESSAGE history. Content lives only in Knock EVENT LOGS (no state), read via eth_getLogs — on-chain DATA but not a re-executable view → grade ≤ C, labeled off-chain. Weight-sorted client-side by chainc/door.ts rankKnocks().

Data edge: off-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN + CLIENT_FETCH · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x646f6f722d666565640000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Event-log feed via the client-side doorFeedFilter() adapter — never dressed as Grade A. The Grade-A half is door-knocks.

proof-setup

That a client artifact's SHA-256 is PINNED on-chain in a SetupPinRegistry (content-addressed, append-only), with pinner + uri — read via a view → Grade A for the READ. Whether the digest is the real setup rests on the pinner; the teeth are the ≤C artifact-verify. Fails closed to "unavailable"/"not pinned".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x70726f6f662d7365747570000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Pairs with artifact-verify (≤C): fetch the artifact, SHA-256 it, compare to this pinned digest.

artifact-verify

Verify a FETCHED client artifact against an on-chain-pinned SHA-256: fetch the bytes + hash them client-side and compare → ≤ C, labeled off-chain (CLIENT_FETCH). The teeth behind proof-setup; never says 'trusted', only 'matches the on-chain pin' (or not).

Data edge: off-chain · Capability: CLIENT_FETCH · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x61727469666163742d7665726966790000000000000000000000000000000000

Pure client check (chainc/proof-badge.ts verifyArtifact) over fetched bytes — not a chain read, never Grade A.

compute-credit

A play-key's compute credit (funded / spent / remaining) in a ComputeCreditVault, read via a view → Grade A. The provider draws down only against the play-key's EIP-712-signed usage receipts (cannot overcharge) and the play-key withdraws unspent anytime. The COMPUTE paid for is off-chain (attested, ≤C) — the card says so. Fails closed to "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x636f6d707574652d637265646974000000000000000000000000000000000000

RelayerBinding = Eip712Bound (provider bound to signed receipts). Sign receipts with chainc/compute-credit.ts usageReceiptTypedData.

xchain-balance

A home-token balance proven by storage proof (header -> state root -> token account -> balance slot) and cached PER ROOT SOURCE by an immutable XchainBalanceCache; renders the highest-grade fresh entry as " · proven @ block N · s old · Grade (on )". Age is seconds since the proven header timestamp. Grade = min(root source ceiling, the grade the token record was proven at): same-chain root -> A (relative to the host chain), relay root -> C, Arbitrum parent root (arb-retryable) -> A relative to the host, always shown with the host facet (XchainBalanceResolverV2). Fails closed to "unavailable"; with no fresh entry renders "stale (proven @ block N · Grade )" (V2 with a host facet: "stale (proven @ block N · Grade · on · )"). Malformed args render "unavailable". Symbols are [A-Za-z0-9]{1,11}, decimals <= 77.

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x78636861696e2d62616c616e6365000000000000000000000000000000000000

Cross-chain root sources and grade ceilings: same-chain → A, relay → C, arb-retryable → A. Off the home chain the value is shown with the host facet (enforced by XchainBalanceResolverV2).

Does not establish:

• anything beyond the host chain's own consensus (host-chain grade)
• the balance now - only as of the proven block
• anything the cache or its root source does not establish (see those)

Refresh with chainc/xchain.ts buildBalanceProof -> XchainBalanceCache.refresh (permissionless, monotone per root source). Register a token once with buildRecordProof -> registerToken.

xchain-snapshot-balance

What an already-deployed home token's own balanceOf returned during a transaction (BalanceSnapshotter.snapshot, gas-floored, code hash and decimals committed), proven by storage proof against the SNAPSHOTTER's storage (header -> state root -> snapshotter account, code hash pinned -> commitment slot) and cached PER ROOT SOURCE by an immutable SnapshotBalanceCache; renders " <0x full address> · balanceOf @ block N (in-transaction) · s old · Grade (on [ · ])". Metadata (name/symbol) is proven separately and used only under the same token code hash and no later than the snapshot block, else "unavailable (no metadata)" / "unavailable (code changed)". Grade = min(entry source ceiling, metadata source ceiling, A): same-chain -> A, relay -> C, arb-retryable -> A relative to the host with the host facet (FacetRequired off home). Stale: "stale ( <0x address> · balanceOf @ block N · Grade [ · on · ])". Display only; malformed args render "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x78636861696e2d736e617073686f742d62616c616e6365000000000000000000

Cross-chain root sources and grade ceilings: same-chain → A, relay → C, arb-retryable → A. Off the home chain the value is shown with the host facet (enforced by SnapshotBalanceResolver).

Does not establish:

• anything beyond the host chain's own consensus (host-chain grade)
• the balance now - only what balanceOf returned during a transaction in the snapshot block
• that the holder held this balance outside that call - mid-transaction state can be temporary (flash loans)
• anything the cache, the home BalanceSnapshotter or the root source does not establish (see those)

Snapshot on home with BalanceSnapshotter.snapshot(token, holders) (permissionless) and recordMetadata(token) once; then chainc/xchain-snapshot.ts buildMetadataProof -> SnapshotBalanceCache.registerToken and buildSnapshotProof -> refresh (monotone per root source).

xchain-adopted-balance

A holder's balance of an already-deployed home token under ONE adoption claim (TokenAdoptionRegistry: the claim names a pinning adapter and a layout adapter by address + code hash; structural code checks at adoption; a witness balance confirmed by a same-chain proof of the adoption block), proven by storage proof under the claim's layout and cached PER ROOT SOURCE by an immutable AdoptedBalanceCache keyed by claim id; renders " <0x full address> · proven @ block N · s old · Grade C (adopted · claim <0x8…8> · on [ · ])". Always Grade C: the layout rests on published evidence the chain does not check (a client that verifies the evidence bundle may show B; nothing shows A). Stale: "stale ( <0x address> · proven @ block N · Grade C · adopted · claim <0x8…8>[ · on · ])". A proxy upgrade makes every later proof revert. Malformed args or an unregistered claim render "unavailable".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x78636861696e2d61646f707465642d62616c616e636500000000000000000000

Cross-chain root sources and grade ceilings: same-chain → C, relay → C, arb-retryable → C. Off the home chain the value is shown with the host facet (enforced by AdoptedBalanceResolver). Rests on an adoption claim, so every ceiling is C.

Does not establish:

• anything beyond the host chain's own consensus (host-chain grade)
• the balance now - only as of the proven block
• that the claimed storage layout is the token's real one (Grade C) - see the claim's evidence
• anything the cache, the home registry or the root source does not establish (see those)

Adopt on home with TokenAdoptionRegistry.adopt(claim), confirm with chainc/xchain-adopted.ts buildAdoptedStateProof at the adoption block -> confirmWitness; then buildRegistryProof -> AdoptedBalanceCache.register and buildAdoptedStateProof -> refresh (monotone per root source).

swap-lock

A home-chain HashTimelockSwap lock's state (open / claimed / refunded), proven by storage proof (header -> state root -> swap account, code hash pinned -> stateOf[id] slot; the id is content-addressed, so the proof covers every term) and cached by an immutable SwapLockProofCache, which also guards the counterpart lock on its own chain; renders " lock · · to 0x8…8[ · ends in h m | past deadline] · proven @ block N · s old · Grade (on [ · ])". The amount uses the token's PROVEN symbol and decimals when it is registered in the pinned XchainBalanceCache, else " base units of 0x8…8". Grade = the root source ceiling: same-chain -> A, arb-retryable -> A relative to the host with the host facet (FacetRequired off home). Stale: "stale (proven @ block N · Grade [ · on · ])". Malformed args or an unproven id render "unavailable". The swap itself is <= C (inclusion before each deadline).

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x737761702d6c6f636b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Cross-chain root sources and grade ceilings: same-chain → A, arb-retryable → A. Off the home chain the value is shown with the host facet (enforced by SwapLockResolver).

Does not establish:

• anything beyond the host chain's own consensus (host-chain grade)
• the lock's state now - only as of the proven block
• that 'ends in' is exact - it compares the home chain's deadline with this chain's clock
• anything the lock cache or its root source does not establish (see those)

Lock on home with HashTimelockSwap.lock(terms); after a home root covering the lock block is delivered, chainc/xchain-swap.ts buildLockProof -> SwapLockProofCache.proveLock (permissionless, monotone). The second party locks on the host with guard = the cache and guardData = the home lock id.

scope-disclosure

What a subject's trust grade does NOT establish (doc 175 X7), read from its IScopeDisclosure via a view -> Grade A for the READ (the list is self-declared text). Renders "does not establish: a · b"; fails closed to "scope not disclosed".

Data edge: on-chain · Capability: READ_CHAIN · Args encoding: abi.encode

Kind constant: 0x73636f70652d646973636c6f7375726500000000000000000000000000000000